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One industry insider, whom I spoke to, offered this explanation for the action of the account homes: “It’s about the NAV. They can’t risk showing a minimal NAV.” That may be, and there may be other reasons as well. One thing appears certain to me: both these fund houses (and perhaps others as well) seem to be desperate to task an illusion of security around FMPs.
What is worse is that these fund houses are trying to manipulate investors by playing on their behavioural biases. Take for instance, your choice by HDFC MF to roll over one of its FMPs. 20% of its collection in Essel group companies. However, in conditions of their romantic relationship with traders, the roll over attacks me in an effort to delude the traders into believing that they never risked losing profits.
Similarly, I noted an extremely careful selection of words by one of the spokespersons of Kotak MF, which also struck me as intended to delude investors. To paraphrase the comment: “The impact is primarily on the returns, not on principle”. To that I am tempted to retort: “Have you ever heard of your time value of money?
- Be in a position to walk someone through the steps/process of performing this kind of valuation
- Material managing
- FCF =
- 1953 forward: U.S. Government 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rates (GS10 series)
- 9 years ago from UK
- Don’t try to Time the Market
” Even more bizarre was another statement by see your face: “I have a tendency to disagree that it is a call gone wrong”. For anyone wondering in what the account houses were thinking still, I present this (hopefully accurate) observation from the latest HDFC MF and Kotak MF profile disclosures. While the majority of the NCDs of Essel group companies were kept in FMP portfolios, there were only two open-end personal debt money that also held these NCDs. We were holding HDFC Credit Risk Debts Kotak and Finance Credit Risk Finance. Need I say anything more?
In that sense, this merger is a superb opportunity; a chance for traders as well as for Brandon to return back to the insurance business. The offer will add 7% to Y’s book value per share. How Much Does Own Equities Improve Investment Returns? So let’s have a quick look as of this.
One part of the story is that Y can increase results on float investments of the mixed company. At this true point, TRH got very little in equities investments of their float. Equities were significantly less than 5% of TRH’s investments and accounted for 13% of the business’s shareholders’ equity. In comparison to this, Y had 31% of total investments in equities and equities was 52% of Y’s shareholders’ collateral. They don’t use returns on equity investments, but I suppose it’s not significant.
What can occur to this return if the mixed Y increases equity investments? We can see from the above table that buying equities, even during the most severe financial meltdown added about 2.9% to investment returns versus a fixed income benchmark. Of all First, let’s go through the aftereffect of increased investment leverage.
1.3x, so Y could have 1.3x shareholders equity in incremental comes back. How about heading the other way? What if TRH had higher collateral allocation, or if their investment returns were similar to Y than TRH’s actual investment profits? Again, this is very, very rough, but if we believe that TRH gained the benchmark fixed income index return of say, 5%, then Y’s management might have added 2.9% to that investment return by keeping more in equities.
Assuming TRH’s investment leverage is 3.4x, that would be 9.9% in incremental investment returns on shareholders’ equity. Of course, this is a simple evaluation and things won’t workout so straightforwardly. There will also be constraints to collateral investments. Y currently has 52% or so of shareholders’ equity in stocks and around 1/3 of total investments.